Could this be the beginning of understanding the dramas and intrigues of the historic June 12, 1993 election?
Perhaps. Perhaps, too, for the first time, the high priest of that epoch, Gen Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, is going
beyond the first layer of the mystery of what is today referred as "June 12." The retired army general was the military president at the time and he had managed that political process. Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola (MKO) was widely believed to have won the election,but Babangida annulled it before the umpire, the National
Electoral Commission (NEC), announced the final result.The consequences of that act were dire and the rebounds
ugly. Even today, those consequences are still gnawing at the delicate aspects of the country.Twenty years on, full and authentic story of that period has eluded Nigerians and it is so because, those who are in the know have maintained sealed lips. Well, until now. A book, Ibrahim Babangida: TheMilitary, Politics and Power in Nigeria, written by one of the founding members of
Newswatch magazine, Dan Agbese, may have given us a serious glimpse into those dark, troubling days. One of the
most striking, if surprising, is that, against all expectations
and imaginations, IBB, the man who annulled the election,had actually encouraged Abiola in every way possible to run. In an interview with IBB, published in the book, †ђξ former military president said he supported Abiola "a lot,morally and financially in the campaign." He said he gave Abiola N35 million to help in the election.
According to him, before Abiola entered the race, he and Babangida "talked of the pros and cons" of Abiola's presidential ambition. And when Abiola "eventually decided that he wanted to go (for it), I supported the idea that he should do it."According to Babangida, he had wanted to make Abiola †ђξ chairman of the Transitional Council because he believed his friend "enjoyed tremendous political goodwill. His
name was a household name. He had the international contact and Nigeria too had a very good chance of having
someone like him heading that organisation."
However, according to the book, this proposition was dead on arrival as some of Babangida's colleagues in the ruling
council opposed it. Instead, they agreed to accept him as a member of the council but not the chairman.
Babangida, according to the book, told Abiola he would bring him in as a member and ensure that the members of the Transitional Council elect him chairman.The book further reveals that the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) had decided that the chairman of the
Transitional Council should come from the South West where Abiola came from. But Abiola rather wanted Babangida to announce him as chairman "straight away."He told Babangida that, that was how his family wanted it because they feared that the president might change his
mind once he made him just a member. "Left to me," says Babangida, "I wanted to make him the chairman. Then he
decided and blew it."The emergence of the two presidential candidates was
equally dramatic. It followed †ђξ disqualification of 23 presidential aspirants. According to the book, IBB had regarded the 23 disqualified from participating in †ђξ presidential election, as the first 11 among the politicians jostling for power. Their ban thus paved the way for †ђξ emergence of new political actors on the stage of †ђξ transition programme."With the first 11 put out in the cold, there were few
runners in the field. Two men easily emerged from †ђξ thin crowd of presidential aspirants. One was the
billionaire philanthropist, Bashorun M.K.O Abiola, who nursed a presidential ambition going back all the way to
the major financiers of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN)."He intended to contest the presidential election on †ђξ platform of the party in 1983. The party moguls erected obstacle in the way. He quit the party and partisan politics altogether in 1982. He was affected by the ban on former politicians and public office holders and unsuccessfully
challenged his ban at the tribunal. With the ban lifted, he joined SDP in January 1993 and was elected the party's
presidential flag bearer at its convention in Jos in March that year.The other man was Alhaji Bashir Tofa, who, like Abiola,
was a national executive member of NPN. He was †ђξ party's national financial secretary. He picked the
presidential ticket of the NRC at its convention at Port Harcourt in March 1993.Both men were Babangida's close friends."Babangida was not quite comfortable with this. He says he feared people would accuse him of manipulating †ђξ transition programme to favour his close friends. He even
tried to discourage Tofa from contesting the election."I told him (Tofa) in the presence of about 13 of his colleagues. I advised him not to seek for that election. ℓ̊ didn't support him. He was not a winning candidate."According to the book, even as the chairman of National Electoral Commission, Professor Humphrey Nwosu, had
seen the conduct of the presidential election as critical †☺ the entire transition programme and was on ground to see that it ended on a sound note. But the cloud was gathering, as the "National Defence and Security Council
did not openly object to the two presidential candidates –
Abiola and Tofa – but some elements in the military in
cahoots with some of the politicians wanted to stop them
from contesting the election.
"Several times the council, pressurised by these elements,
came close to disqualifying the two men. Some members
of the council felt that neither Abiola nor Tofa was fit to be
president. They assailed Abiola's character. Babangida
recalls that "they never saw him as somebody who was
morally upright or fit…"
"They tried to blackmail him as a government contractor to
whom the government owed a lot of money and they
didn't feel comfortable that this would be their
commander – in – chief."
The book notes how providence smiled on the two
presidential candidates and, according to Babangida, the
council feared that " if we stopped it (the election), we
would be in trouble again. What was paramount in our
mind then was we wouldn't like to be accused again of not
wanting to leave office. So, we said let the bloody thing go
on."
The decision to "let the bloody thing go on," was actually a
fluke. The military, according to Babangida, believed "that
we would have an inconclusive election. We thought we
should be fair to let it run and when it became
inconclusive, then we would take whatever action that we
deemed necessary over a re-run or a re-election or
something like that."
The military, the book says, underrated Abiola's clout, as
his followership unsettled those elements in the military
that did not like him. "About a week or so before the June
12, 1993, presidential election, security reports indicated
that Abiola would certainly trounce Tofa beyond dispute.
He would win on the first ballot. The election would not be
inconclusive. The report caused some jitters in military
circle. What to do?"
The cabal in the military that didn't want Abiola, was
saddled with what line of action to take next.
According to the book, at this stage of confusion in the
military hierarchy, former Second Republic senator,
Francis Nzeribe, came up with the military-should-stay
campaign, which served as tonic for the government. He
formed the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN), with
Abimbola Davies as his second in command.
"Nzeribe went to Abuja high court on June 10 to stop the
presidential election for alleged irregularities and
corruption in the conduct of the SDP primaries won by
Abiola. ABN alleged that Abiola used money to induce the
majority of the delegates to vote for him.
"At 9.30pm on the same day, the court, presided over by
justice Bassey Ita Ikpeme, now deceased, threw the
spanner into the works. She "restrained (NEC) from
conducting the presidential election on the June 12, 1993."
Her judgment was the first major indication that the
transition programme was under serious threat. "Nwosu
tried to salvage it. He appeared before the NDSC on June
11 and put a strong argument in favour of going ahead
with the election. He argued, quite passionately, that if the
election was postponed, the election materials already on
site would be compromised.
"NEC had enough protection under the decree to ignore
Ikpeme's ruling. But the Attorney General and Minister of
Justice, Clement Akpamgbo, had a different take on the
issue. He did not support Nwosu's position. Instead, he
advised that the election be postponed in obedience to the
order, NEC could then appeal and have the order set aside
by a superior court.
Sent from my BlackBerry® smartphone provided by Airtel Nigeria.
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